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Abstract. ​A series of bots performing simulated social engineering attacks          
using phishing in the Twitter platform was developed to identify potentially           
unsafe user behavior. In this work, four different bot versions collected           
feedback data after stimuli directed to 1287 Twitter accounts for 38           
consecutive days. The results were not conclusive about the existence of           
predictors for unsafe behavior, but we conclude that despite Twitter’s security           
policies, this kind of attack is still feasible. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Currently, several methods of social engineering attacks are used by attackers to gain an              
advantage over victims. In addition, to direct contact with victims it is commonly             
possible to use devices such as e-mail [Oliveira et al. 2017, Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz              
2006], fake website [Jakobsson et al. 2008], automated social engineering [Shafahi et al.             
2016, Lauinger et al. 2010, Huber et al. 2009, Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz 2006],             
obtaining information by searching garbage [Mitnick and Simon 2003, p. 126], peeking            
over a user's shoulders [Mitnick and Simon 2003, p. 176] [Purkait 2012], and many              
others [Hatfield 2018, Mitnick and Simon 2003]. These attacks act on the so-called             
weakest link​ or the user [Schneier 2001] [Mitnick and Simon 2003, p. 3]. 
In social engineering, the attacker uses influence and (or) persuasion to           
impersonate someone else or persuade the victim to perform actions that the victim             
would not normally do [Mitnick and Simon 2003, p. vii]. Social engineering on the              
Internet can make users provide sensitive information or facilitate malware infection.           
Phishing is a social engineering technique that can be defined as a scalable fraud, where               
personification is used to gain influence (and/or persuade) to collect information from            
the victim that would not normally be provided [Lastdrager 2014]. Thus, the social             
engineering attack via phishing can be divided in two stages: (i) personification; and (ii)              
information collection. It is common to use bots that perform phishing attacks in an              
automated manner, which substantially aggravate the situation. These types of attacks           
represent a serious threat to information security, as they increase the range of the              
attacks [Lauinger et al. 2010] making them cheaper [Huber et al. 2009]. 
Nowadays, artificial intelligence is advanced enough to produce bots that are           
capable of posing as human beings [Shafahi et al. 2016]. This type of bot is called a                 
social bot. According to Rouse (2013), a social bot is a software that is capable of                
simulating human behavior through automated interactions on an online social network.           
Bots can be used on social networks with good motivations (e.g., a chatbot that              
responds respectfully to interactions with customers from some organization), but can           
also be used for doing malevolent tasks such as sharing spam, vectors for phishing or               
fake news dissemination [Freitas et al. 2015]. 
As related work we may cite Shafahi et al. (2016) that report the use of bots to                 
simulate human behavior for phishing tests on Twitter. In Lauinger et al. (2010) attacks              
that simulate human behavior performed on Internet relay chat are described. In Huber             
et al. (2009) automated social engineering attacks on Facebook social media are            
described. Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz (2006) study attacks where the target is an online             
auction site, in addition they promote a discussion on the ethics involved in carrying out               
this type of scientific research. Shafahi et al. (2016) work is the most similar to ours                
since they use the Twitter platform, but their work focuses on measuring the risk that               
Twitter brings to corporate networks.  
Among the various social media options, we can highlight Twitter, which is very             
popular worldwide. In January 2019, Twitter contained about 326 million active user            
accounts per month. In 2016, Brazil was one of the countries with the highest growth in                
Twitter accounts [Oliveira 2017]. One of the threats to Twitter users is phishing, an              
already known problem, but there is difficulty in detecting this type of attack [Purkait              
2012, Jakobsson et al. 2008, Hatfield 2018]. There are already clear demonstrations that             
current anti-phishing tools do not work efficiently [Jakobsson et al. 2008, Purkait 2012].             
However, some studies have already shown that the work that aims to educate people              
against this threat has good results [Alencar et al. 2013, Purkait 2012].  
Therefore, this work's premise assumes that to obtain more impactful results against            
phishing, it is necessary to know more about this form of attack. The main problem               
addressed is to identify account data that indicate which are the most vulnerable to a               
phishing attack on Twitter. In order to identify such data, bots were created to collect               
information. ​Thus, the main contribution of this work is the description of the design              
process, including a bot architecture that simulates automated social engineering attacks           
on Twitter. The designed bot has a great chance of acting continuously suggesting that              
the Twitter platform is not fully prepared to mitigate such abuses.  
The rest of the article includes in Section 2 the adopted methodology; in Section 3,               
we describe four experiments with their results; in Section 4, we present a short              
discussion,  followed by conclusions in Section 5. 
 2.  Methodology 
 
The research was carried out within strict scientific and ethical criteria, observing the             
difficulty of the phenomenon to be investigated, aiming to test concepts about the             
operation of social engineering and phishing. The attacks were simulated, i.e. they were             
carried out in the most innocuous way possible, without collecting any data eventually             
reported by the attacked users or account data that would allow their subsequent             
identification.  
In the experiments, the participants were not explicitly warned that a scientific            
experiment was undergoing, aiming to prevent them from exhibiting different behavior           
from that which would occur in their daily lives. Despite that, participants were informed              
implicitly about the experiment as explained in Section 4.2. The sequence of four             
experiments were performed with incremental degree of complexity, where the data and            
results obtained in an experiment indicated the features to be inserted in the following              
one. 
 
  2.1  Attack planning 
The attack planning consiste on defining what would be executed to fulfill the objective              
of the experiment based on six steps:  
1. ​Tweet flow identification - ​the accounts to be attacked would be chosen from the               
activity of publishing tweets, so that an attempt was made to identify a relevant and               
pertinent tweet flow (obtained through the use of keywords) to separate the possible             
victims, according to their interest groups; 
2. ​Obtaining tweet flows - ​a continuous flow of tweets would be obtained on Twitter               
associated with interest groups, which would be stored in a buffer and be asynchronously              
consumed; 
3. ​Account sampling - as the tweet flow was consumed, account sampling was             
performed identifying those that would be attacked; 
4. ​Personification - by sending stimuli for the accounts to be attacked in the form of new                 
tweets personified by the bots, offering information of potential interest to the users of              
these accounts. Anonymous identifiers were generated, and some account attributes were           
stored and linked to these identifiers (a theme of the tweet, number of followers, number               
of followers, number of posts, length of existence, and location information); 
5. ​Analysis of the response to stimuli - for users who “took the bait” from the tweets,                 
they would be presented with a page that supposedly sought to complete the attack,              
through the collection of personal data; and 
6. ​Accounting - user behavior report (e.g., visit to the page after the attack, offer of                
personal data, visit the website page) generation. 
 
2.2  Account samplings 
 
Sampling and identification of accounts were based on the FollowerRank, which is an             
indicator used to measure the relevance of the article's author. The use of FollowerRank              
had its applicability demonstrated in the work of Nagmoti et al. (2010). Equation 1 defines               
how to calculate FollowerRank, where i(a) is the number of followers of an account, and               
o(a) the number of accounts that an account follows. 
 
         FR(a) = i(a) / i(a) + o(a)  
 
(1) 
 
The initial hypothesis was that there could be some correlation between an            
account's FollowerRank and its user's vulnerability to social engineering attacks. For each            
tweet captured, the FollowerRank of the corresponding account was calculated, and these            
were segmented into FollowerRank bands. Each account in a range would receive a             
different attack bait, accessible through a tweet containing a URL pointing to a page that               
should be visited by the account user. An attribute in the URL allowed linking to the                
anonymized account identifier. 
 
3.  Experiments and results 
 
Each experiment demanded knowledge of how Twitter works, and which strategies would 
be sufficient to make the bots work. 
 
3.1  Experiment 1 
 
One of the main objectives of Experiment 1 was to identify the thematic areas that would                
be explored in the identification of victims, based on journalistic texts that condense the              
annual reports on the use of the Twitter platform in Brazil. The most-commented topics              
were distributed among musical events, reality shows, major sporting events, and           
investigations by the Federal Police [de São Paulo 2017, Alves 2017]. The most popular              
subjects belonged to three areas: entertainment, sports, and politics. These were the theme             
areas chosen for the other experiments. 
After identifying the areas, keywords were screened to identify possible victims for            
the experiments. There were 30 keywords in each thematic area. Experiment 1 performed             
a collection of 32.6 GB of tweets in JSON format, referring to the chosen thematic areas.                
Whenever the use of a keyword in a tweet was identified, all information of this tweet was                 
stored. This data allowed to profile the FollowerRank of the active accounts in the              
thematic areas. 
 
3.2  Experiment 2 
 
The second experiment tested the first phishing attack strategy. The web server developed             
in this experiment was the same used in all subsequent ones. This one presented a page                
containing a form that requested personal data of the user, for a supposed registration,              
aiming to present him a piece of news. All accesses were counted.  
The page had two buttons: register and access; and access without registration.            
There was also a text: “To see the project of this scientific research click here”. This last                 
URL directed the user to read the real research project reported here. The eventual access               
of users to the research project document was accounted. Figure 1 (in Portuguese)             
presents an example of the page presented to users. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example page shown to user responding to attack. 
 
When clicking on the button “Access without registration”, regardless of filling in            
the form data, the user was redirected to a legitimate page, which contained real              
information, addressing a related subject to one of the thematic areas. The possible access              
of the user to the news was counted, without the registration. The “Register and access”               
button was enabled only when non-null data were filled in all fields of the form. As with                 
the “Access without registration” button, the “victim” in this case was directed to the              
same legitimate page. Possible access to news after the supposed realization of the register              
was also accounted for. The data eventually informed by user in the form was not sent to                 
the server, nor was it stored in any way. 
The success of a phishing attack depends on a personification attractive enough            
that the victims are tempted to act inappropriately. The personification was based on the              
use of real news, obtained directly and automatically, from a very popular news portal in               
Brazil. When implementing Experiment 2, the bot always used the first news item on the               
editorial page, referring to the topic of the potential interest of a user, given that his                
Twitter account had previously tweeted about that theme. 
Experiment 2 was carried out on two batteries, one short, 30 minutes, on the              
eighteenth day of the research, and the other long, with a duration of three hours, on the                 
nineteenth day of the research, when the accounts that were being used by the bots were                
banned by the Twitter platform.  
The attacks lasted only a few hours. Two different accounts were used, where each              
account made specific posts in one of the thematic areas: sports or entertainment. 65              
tweets (32 in one account and 33 in another) were sent to different users. The researchers                
chose not to carry out tests on the subject of politics, as Experiment 2 was carried out                 
during the period of the Brazilian election campaign of 2018. During three days of              
execution of the pseudo-attacks of Experiment 2, the 65 attacks sent stimulated 51 hits.              
Most of these accesses came from news about sports, totaling 50 accesses, while only one               
access was made through news related to entertainment. 
After performing Experiment 2, it was understood that the bots did not meet the              
established functional requirements. It should be much more subtle to pass unnoticed by Twitter's              
detection mechanisms. This fostered a refinement in the bots' requirements. Through a new             
reading of the use rules of the Twitter API, it was noticed that we were failing in the following                   
points: (i) all the tweets mentioned the attacked accounts; (ii) many posts were duplicated or very                
similar; and (iii) the bot redirected users to an intermediate page before sending to the news. 
3.3  Experiment 3 
 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to solve the flaws of the previous experiment. For each                
of the three failures of Experiment 2, a mitigation technique was adopted. All bot tweets               
mentioned another account, whose mitigation consisted of posting other tweets,          
interspersed with pseudo-attack tweets. Many posts were duplicated or similar, which           
motivated the diversification of the baits sent, combined with the posting of legit tweets              
(not attacks). The bot performed the redirection to an intermediate page. As it was not               
possible to avoid redirection we used an URL shortener. 
The attacks occurred for two uninterrupted days. The tests were suspended due to             
another blocking of one of the accounts used, among the three different accounts used by               
three bots, each with specific posts in one of the thematic areas: politics, sports, or               
entertainment. It was unclear why the account was banned. Three possible reasons were             
raised to explain this ban: a target made a complaint; the bot worked 24 hours a day,                 
without pause; and the bot used to post frequently.  
Experiment 3 did not produce user interaction data that were relevant. However,            
there were strong indications that the development of the experiments were progressing            
satisfactorily. Despite the ban on one of the accounts, that account was much longer              
running, compared to Experiment 2. Table 1 presents the number of attacks sent in              
Experiment 3, segmented by thematic area. 
 
Experiment Politics Sports Entertainment TOTAL 
3 336 160 245 741 
4 353 216 - 569 
 
Table 1. Tweets per subject for Experiments 3 and 4. 
 
3.4  Experiment 4 
 
Similar to what happened in Experiment 3, the lessons learned in the previous             
experiment served to support the improvements in the new version of the bots.             
Mitigation techniques were adopted for the three possible reasons for banning the lost             
account in  Experiment 3. 
We realized that the experiments could not be performed uninterruptedly. Therefore,           
during the night, the experiments started to be interrupted. Besides, it was found that bots               
should act less frequently becoming similar to human behavior [Almeida and Gondim            
2019]. The decrease in the tweeting speed occurred through a very simple solution:             
disregarding a significant fraction of the potential targets. 
After the adjustments, the tests were resumed, and their interruption occurred at the             
decision of the researchers, and there was no problem with the platform differently from              
Experiments 2 and 3. Two different accounts were used, where each bot-controlled an             
account and made specific posts in one of the thematic areas: politics or sports. During               
the entire execution of experiment 4,569 messages were sent with URLs, distributed            
among political and sports subjects. If compared to Experiment 3, 17 more URLs were              
sent in the political subject, and 56 more URLs in the sports subject. Table 1 presents the                 
number of attack tweets sent in Experiment 4 segmented by thematic area. Experiment 4              
served to show evidence that the developed bot applies to automated social engineering             
attacks. The bots worked for 10 days without detection, and some even managed to              
impersonate human users, obtaining followers. 
 
3.5 Profiling 
 
The 1287 stimuli sent generated 955 visits by single users to the phishing website, and 15                
visits to the legitimate news page, support visit to the phishing website. A visitor              
downloaded the document with the research project. In order to identify factors that could              
lead Twitter users to respond insecurely to phishing attacks, logistic regressions were            
used, such as the one that [Oliveira et al. 2017] used, to “profile” vulnerable users. The                
various models aimed to identify whether the attributes of the attacked accounts could             
predict the chance of users associated with these accounts accessing the data collection             
page. Some significant, but low value, correlations were detected, relative to the positive             
value for the political issue, in relation to sports, while the time of existence of the account                 
has a negative correlation. 
 
4.  Discussion 
The bots developed in this work are less sophisticated than those described in Shafahi et               
al. (2016), concerning the simulation of human behavior. However, interactions with users            
that signal that at least some of the bots managed to pass themselves off as human users.                 
Also, the research reported here developed more aggressive attacks, which came into            
direct contact with the victims, employing mentions to their accounts. But without            
collecting data that would allow for later identification of the victim. The research,             
although it did not identify which factors would be strong predictors of users' unsafe              
behavior, managed to produce significant results. 
The bot developed in Experiment 4 proved to be stable, carrying out attacks by about               
10 days without being detected. Added to the data from Experiment 3, the number of               
attacks carried out was over a thousand. In other words, the main contribution of this work                
was the conception of an exploratory methodology to build bots capable of circumventing             
Twitter's automatic verification mechanisms. The results suggest that the detection of bots            
on Twitter does not involve linguistic means (such as detecting regular expressions), but             
the observation of clear non-human behavior in parameters such as frequency and            
continuity of tweets, duration of activity and the like. This detection approach is quite              
simple and general and seeks not to impact user's experience. 
 
5.  ​Conclusion 
An incremental iterative methodology was proposed for the development of experiments           
in the construction of bots that simulate social engineering attacks on Twitter. We             
developed a bot that managed to work for ten days without detection in the Twitter               
platform, attacking users in a potentially aggressive way. The hits may be used in future               
experiments related to the theme. The lessons learned in Experiments 2 and 3 can be used                
as examples of bad practices.  
From the perspective of future work, we intend to extend the experiments over a              
longer period with the execution on other platforms. We may observe different user's             
attributes to map more significant predictors of unsafe behavior considering users in face             
of social engineering attacks. 
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